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ABSTRACT 
This study looks at the relationship between constituency 
service and party ties at the local and national levels. The data 
come from two surveys: one of the British electorate in May 1979 and 
the other of Members and their agents in those constituencies sampled 
in the voter study. Pressures at the local party level, it is argued, 
reinforce the electoral incentive for Members to perform constituency 
services diligently. Members widely believe that constituency work 
improves relations with activists and bolsters local party morale. 
For their part, core constituents -- activists and strong party 
identifiers � value constituency work very highly and are more likely 
than other groups in the electorate to make use of the Member's 
services. 
The effect of constituency effort at the local level is to 
weaken party ties at the national level. Ivor Crewe noted that Labour 
fought very well in its marginal seats in 1979, and this study argues 
that this was because Labour MPs in marginal seats worked hard to 
establish a local identity. MPs in marginal seats tend to have more 
favourable voter ratings than do those in safer seats. Moreover, MPs 
who were active in their constituencies had better swings in 1979 than 
MPs who were inactive. For Labour Members, constituency work 
"cushioned" the swing, and for Conservative Members, it "amplified" 
the swing. The paper concludes with some speculation about why 
nonpolicy pressures might increase at the local level. 
BLESSED BE THE TIE THAT UNBINDS: CONSTITUENCY PRESSURES 
AND NATIONAL PARTY FORCES IN GREAT BRITAIN 
Bruce E. Cain 
There are recent signs that the ties between British Members 
of Parliament and their local parties may be changing in important 
ways. The conventional wisdom has been that activists do not much 
affect the behavior of Members [Finer et. al., 1961; Frasure, 1971], 
and in so far as they do, they tend to enforce a closer adherence 
between the policy positions of individual Members and party leaders 
[Epstein, 1964]. It now appears that certain militant activists in 
the Labour party are pressuring their MPs to dissent from the party 
leadership's moderate policies, and many believe that the intent 
behind automatic reselection � a rule adopted at the 1979 Labour 
Conference requiring that Members submit themselves for readoption at 
each election � is to make Labour Members even more vulnerable to 
such pressures in the future. Leaving formal procedures aside, all 
sitting M.P.s will soon face what amounts to reselection due to 
extensive changes in constituency boundaries. 
Ties between Members and the national parties may also be 
changing in significant ways. The General Election of May 1979 
exhibited unusual regional deviations which were not at all typical of 
the post war pattern of a uniform national swing: Mrs. Thatcher's 
mandate was considerably weaker in Scotland, the North of England and 
Wales than it was in the South and London [Crewe, 1979]. At the same 
time Phillip Norton's work demonstrates that Members have become more 
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rebellious since 1970 and that it has become harder for the whips to 
maintain party cohesion in Parliament [Norton, 1980; Crowe, 1980]. 
For the most part, the focus of analysis and speculation has 
been on the policy implications of these changes: for instance, will 
reselection and the growth of local party pressures make Labour 
Members more responsive to the policy preferences of party activists 
and less responsive to the policy preferences of the general 
electorate, or, to use another example, will the breakdown of party 
discipline make a government � even one with as large a majority as 
Mrs. Thatcher's �more vulnerable to defeat in Parliament and less 
able to implement its policies? These are questions of fundamental 
importance, but they should not cause us to overlook various nonpolicy 
considerations. A significant amount of the Member's time is devoted 
to looking after the interests of constituents and constituencies 
[Dowse, 1963; King, 1974; Richards, 1972]. There is some evidence 
that this aspect of the Member's job has grown in importance since the 
war: caseloads have increased, Members are being encouraged to take a 
greater interest in local issues by their constituency parties, and 
some Members, in marginal seats especially, have felt it necessary to 
adopt a demanding "grassrooting0 approach to their constituency work 
[Barker and Rush, 1967; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1980]. 
The central question this paper will address is how does 
constituency work relate to local and national party ties? What kinds 
of expect_ations do activists and loyalists at the local level have 
about their Member's constituency obligations and will these 
expectations manifest themselves if Labour proceeds with automatic 
3 
reselection? Secondly, at the national level, does the conscientious 
pursuit of constituency work contribute in any way to a weakening of 
the electoral link between Members and their national parties? 
Specifically, does the strategy of diligent constituency work create a 
buffer against adverse national electoral tides, and if it does, what 
implications does this have for national party ties? 
LOCAL PARTY EXPECTATIONS AND CONSTITUENCY WORK 
Shortl y after the concl usion of the 1979 Labour party 
Conference, I asked a Labour M. P. what effect he thought reselection 
might have on his behavior. His response was that he probably would 
have to spend more time courting the favor of local party members and 
attending constituency party meetings. A reform like reselection 
would undoubtedly make relations between party members and M.P.s more 
crucial , but how this would affect the behavior of Members is complex. 
This is partly because projections about how Members and their parties 
would react under such a rule rest on certain counterfactual 
assumptions. One tends to assume, for example, that the composition 
of constituency Labour parties would not change if this rule were 
implemented. Hence, given evidence that certain constituency Labour 
parties are now controll ed by small groups of left wing activists, 
some have argued that reselection would give these groups greater 
leverage over the policy views of their M.P. s and would thereby 
contribute to a significant leftward drift in the Labour party (The 
Times, June 17, 1980, p. 15). However, changing the rules about 
adoption could stimulate a greater interest in constituency Labour 
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politics and attract back into the party individuals with less 
militant leanings. If this were to happen, the prediction of a 
leftward drift might not be ful filled. In the same way, any 
predictions about the nonpolicy implications of reselection will rest 
on crucial counterfactual assumptions. 
The first question to ask is whether activist preferences 
matter when it comes to the M.P.'s constituency work and if so, why? 
One way activists express their preferences about constituency work to 
the Member is through questions and discussions during the adoption 
process [Ranney, 1965; Rush, 1969). Frequently, prospective 
candidates are asked to demonstrate their interest in constituency 
affairs. A specific �anifestation of this is the tendency of local 
parties to ask that their Members take up residency in the 
constituency. Evidence on this point comes from a survey of Members 
and agents conducted in the summer of 1979.1 Excluding agents from 
our sample of interviews, the analysis which fol l ows is based on the 
responses of 93 M. P. s (including the newl y elected, the defeated, 
retirees and sitting Members in a sample of constituencies drawn from 
our voter survey) to questions about their constituency work. When 
asked whether they approved of the practice of asking Members to live 
in the constituency, approximately a third either had no opinion or 
refused to answer, but of those who did, about half (i.e. 32) said 
that they approved of this demand and slightly less than half did not 
approve or had substantial reservations. As for reasons why Members 
thought that residing in the constituency was a good idea, the most 
frequent response � especially among young Conservatives -- was that 
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it demonstrated accessibility and helped Members keep in touch with 
their constituents. Others said that it gave the Member a better 
sense of belonging to the constituency (10 percent) , that it promoted 
good relations with activists (2 percent) , that it enabled them to 
ward off local challenges to the seat (2 percent) and just generally 
that it helped with the job (6 percent) . Those who disapproved of 
this practice also mentioned a variety of reasons. Chief among them 
was that living in the constituency was either too demanding on the 
Member's time or on that of the Member's family (9 percent) , and that 
it made it hard for the Members to stay above divisions in local 
interests and be objective (8 percent) . Many have complied with their 
adoption promises. Approximately 43 percent of those sampled lived in 
the constituency, another 4 percent had some sort of apartment or 
cottage there, 17 percent lived near the constituency, and 21 percent 
did not live in or near the constituency. 
One way, therefore, in which the local party shapes the 
constituency work of the Member is through adoption demands such as 
asking the prospective candidate whether he or she will reside in the 
constituency. Another inducement is the expectation of party related 
benefits associated with constituency work. An overwhelming majority 
of those interviewed in both parties (i.e. 82 percent) felt that doing 
constituency work served to bolster the morale and strength of the 
local party organization in several ways. The most widely perceived 
benefit was that it improved relations with party activists (53 
percent) , making them work harder for the Member at election time and 
increasing their involvement. Turning up at branch meetings and 
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various social events was particularly important in this regard. Some 
(4 percent) also expressed the hope that this work might soften policy 
disagreements with activists by building up a measure of personal 
credit with the local party members. 
There are then two incentives which link local party 
expectations to constituency work. The first centers on adoption and 
the promises which are made at that time. Automatic reselection would 
clearly strengthen this incentive since a Member who did not fulfill 
his or her promises might not get readopted at the next election. The 
second incentive is the desire to improve relations with activists to 
ensure a sound local party organization. Since activist preferences 
about constituency work can matter in both these senses (particularly 
if automatic reselection is implemented) , then the next question is 
whether the expectations of party activists and loyalists differ very 
much from other groups in the electorate. Do they, for example, have 
different expectations about the Member's proper role? What do they 
tend to mention positively and negatively about their M.P. s and do 
they focus on different aspects than do other individuals in the 
electorate? Do they avail themselves of the Member's services as 
frequently as do others? To answer these questions, we turn to a 
study of the British electorate in collaboration with Gallup Poll 
shortly after the May 1979 election. 2 In this study, voters were 
asked a set of questions about their incumbent Member and his or her 
constituency services. Many of these questions paralleled those used 
in the 1978 CPS U. S. Congressional election study. 
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One of the questions in this study asked the respondent to say 
which of the following activities was the most important aspect of the 
M.P.'s job: helping people, protecting the interests of the 
constituency, bureaucratic oversight, keeping in touch, or debating 
and voting. In Table I, the responses are crosstabulated with whether 
the respondent was, 1) a party activist in the same party as the 
incumbent, 2) a strong party identifier in the same party as the 
incumbent, 3) a weak party identifier in the same party as the 
incumbent, 4) an identifier in the party opposite from the incumbent 
and 5) a non-party identifier. Table I allows us to compare the 
expectations of activists and loyalists inside the incumbent's party 
with other groups in the electorate. In addition, it breaks the 
responses down further by Conservative and Labour party so that we can 
check for party differences. 
Table I indicates that expectations about the Member's proper 
role are surprisingly similar across all groups. The three most 
important activities are protecting the interests of the constituency, 
helping people, and keeping in touch, and the two least important 
activities are debating and voting and bureaucratic oversight. 
Activists and strong party identifiers were not more likely to 
emphasize the debating and voting function, as one might have 
plausibly hypothesized, but they were somewhat less likely to mention 
keeping in touch as important. Considering party differences at all 
levels, Conservatives were somewhat more likely than Labour to mention 
protecting the interests of their constituency as important and 
somewhat less likely to mention keeping in touch and helping people. 
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TABLE I 
EXPECTED ROLE OF THE MEMBER 
Protecting the Debating 
Helpini: Interests of the Bureaucratic Keeping in and 
PeoJ!le Conscit.uencz Oversight Touch Voting (N) 
Party Activist ALL 25 50 6 13 6 (16) 
in same party 
as Incumbent 
Strong Party ALL 21 30 5 30 14 (293) 
Identifiers of CON 17 34 6 25 18 
Same Party as LAB 24 27 4 37 9 
Inc. 
Weak Party ALL 28 30 4 25 13 (319) 
Identifier of CON 24 32 4 25 15 
Same Party LAB 33 25 4 25 13 
as Inc. 
Identifies ALL 21 30 6 30 14 (497) 
with Opposite CON 20 34 7 21 18 
Party LAB 22 27 5 35 12 
Does not 
Identifity 21 30 6 31 11 (280) 
with Party 
Source: CFF-Gallup May 1979 Election Study 
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In general, however, the first observation is that the pattern of 
expectations about the Member's proper role does not seem to vary much 
inside or outside the incumbent'& party. 
A second piece of information on this issue comes from the 
open-ended likes and dislikes questions. Respondents were asked to 
say what they liked or did not like about the incumbent Member. 
Positive references fell into three categories: the personal 
qualities of the Member, his or her availability and the amount of 
attention the Member devoted to constituency matters. No other 
responses were sufficient to warrant a separate category. As is 
evident from Table II, those who belonged to the incumbent Member's 
party tended �o emphasize personal qualities and availability while 
nonparty identifiers tended to emphasize attention to local affairs 
somewhat more. There is also some small difference across parties in 
the sense that Conservatives seem to place a greater emphasis on 
personal qualities than do Labourites. This is consistent with the 
testimony of various Conservative M. P.s who told us that personal 
appearance and the attractiveness of one's family often mattered to 
their party members. 
The somewhat more interesting analysis from our point of view 
is of the negative references to the incumbent. These fell into four 
categories: policy objections, not being sufficiently active or 
interested in local affairs, nonavailability, and personal qualities. 
Responses from party activists were far too sparse for analysis. In 
general, policy disagreements with the incumbent were most frequent 
among weak party identifiers. Of the strong party identifiers, it is 
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TABLE II 
WHAT CONSTITUENTS LIKE AND DO NOT LIKE ABOUT THEIR MEMBER 
I. Positive References to Incl.DD.bent 
Personal Paid Attention to 
Qualities AvailabilHy Local Affairs N 
Party Activist AlL 50 33 17 (12) 
in same party CON 
as Incumbent LAB 
Strong Party AlL 43 40 17 (105) 
Identifier of CON 57 29 14 
Same Party as LAB 33 47 20 
Incumbent 
Weak Party AlL 35 37 28 (81) 
Identifier of CON 44 39 17 
Same Party as LAB 29 38 32 
Incumbent 
Identifies with AlL 45 33 22 (73) 
opposite party CON 46 26 29 
from Incumbent LAB 45 �9 16 
Does not identify 31 29 40 (48) 
with party 
II. Negative References to Incumbent 
Not sufficiently 
active or 
Policy interested in Non- Personal 
Objections local affairs availability Qualities N 
Party Activist (2) 
in same party Too Few ObservatiOllll 
as Incuaben t 
Strong Party AlL 26 9 61 4 (23) 
Identifier of CON 0 0 100 0 
Same Party as LAB 25 12 47 6 
Incumbent 
Weak Party AlL 32 18 36 14 (22) 
Identifier of CON 33 22 33 11 
Same Party as LAB 31 15 39 15 
Incumbent 
Identifies with AlL 29 12 46 12 (104) 
opposite part:y CON 39 12 34 15 
from Incumbent LAB 22 13 54 11 
Does not: ident:ify 17 22 48 13 (23) 
with part:y 
Source: CFF - Gallup May 1979 Election Study 
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interesting to notice that policy objections were mentioned by Labour 
but not by Conservative partisans. One explanation for this may be 
that since Labour had been in government for the preceding period, 
Labour Members had been identified with the Callaghan government's 
unpopular and controversial measures. In opposition, policy 
disagreements may be less salient. 
The important thing to observe, however, is that the most 
frequent complaint for all groups is the nonavailability of the 
Member. This is consistent with our previous findings that Members 
themselves think that getting back to the constituency often and 
keeping in touch is so important [Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1980]. 
Contrary to what one might presuppose, nonavailability rather than 
policy disagreement is the most common transgression of the M.P. in 
the eyes of his or her constituents. 
In both the expectations about the Member's proper role and 
the expressed positive and negative references about incumbent 
Members, we have seen no evidence that activists and loyalists place 
any less emphasis on the constituency work of the Member than do 
others in the electorate, Another indication of this is that party 
activists and strong identifiers are even more likely than others to 
make use of the Member's services. In our Gallup study, respondents 
were asked whether they had ever contacted the Member for help or for 
information. As one can readily see from Table III, the probability 
of making use of the Member's constituency services increases with 
strength of identification and with p�rty activism. Members do help 
individuals who identify with the opposite party or with no party, but 
TABLE III 
CITIZEN-INITIATED CONTACT WITH INCUMBENT 
Did Not Contact 
Incumb ent M.P. 
ALL CON LAB 
Party Activist in 45 46 50 
same party as Incumbent 
Strong Party Identifier 87 86 89 
of Same Party as Inc 
Weak Party Identifier 93 92 93 
of Same Party as Inc 
Identifier With 92 92 93 
Opposite Party 
Does Not Identify 96 - -
with Party 
Source: CFF-Gallup May 1979 Election Study 
Contacted the 
Incumb ent M. P. 
ALL CON LAB 
55 54 50 
13 14 11 
7 8 7 
8 8 7 
4 - -
12 
N 
(20 ) 
(330 ) 
(379) 
(580) 
(343) 
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the probability of contact is clearly higher within party ranks rather 
than without. This is true for both parties. 
It is also the case that activists and strong party 
identifiers are more likely to recall specific things that the M.P. 
has done for the constituency than are other individuals in the 
electorate. The Gallup study asked respondents whether they could 
recall anything in particular that the Member had done for the 
constituency. As with incumbent contacts, the probability of 
recalling the Member's district services increases with party activism 
and strength of identification. Nonparty identifiers, by contrast, 
are the least likely to recall anything that the incumbent had done 
for the constituency. Once again, this relationship holds for both 
parties. 
The evidence then, is that constituency service is at least as 
salient to the party activist and strong party identifier as it is to 
other groups in the electorate. Indeed, in terms of the probability 
of having made use of the incumbent's constituency services, or of 
recalling the incumbent's achievements, constituency work may even be 
more important to activists and loyalists than to others. What effect 
then would a policy like automatic reselection have on Member 
behavior? While reselection would undoubtedly strengthen the hands of 
activists who wish to control the policy positions of their M. P.s, it 
would also increase the incentive for Members to attend more 
diligently to their constituency affairs. In previous studies, we 
have shown both that constituency work is perceived to have electoral 
benefit and that the evaluations which British voters form of their 
TABLE IV 
SERVICES OF THE MEMBER 
Party Activist in 
Does Not Recall 
Constituency Service 
ALL CON LAB 
77 6 7  
same party as Incumbent 
Strong Party 
Identifier of Same 
Party as Inc 
Weak Party 
Identifier of Same 
Party as Inc 
Identifier With 
Opposite Party 
Does Not Identify 
with Party 
80 82 79 
87 89 85 
9 0  89 9 0  
89 
Source: CFF-Gallup May 19 79 Election Study 
Recalls 
Constituency Service 
ALL CON LAB 
40 23 33 
20 18 21 
13 11 15 
10 11 10 
11 - -
14 
N 
(20 ) 
(336 ) 
(385) 
(587) 
(257) 
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M.P.s are shaped by constituency contacts of various sorts [Cain, 
Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1979]. In addition to the electoral incentive, 
there is in Great Britain a party incentive to constituency work: the 
expected reward in terms of higher local party morale, more funds and 
better relations with activists. Reselection would strengthen the 
party incentive and contribute to the trend of closer involvement in 
constituent and constituency affairs by Members. To put it another 
way, the more enduring effect of such a reform may be an increasingly 
parocliial perspective rather than policy extremism. 
CONSTITUENCY WORK AND NATIONAL PARTY TIES 
Local electoral and party pressures may be drawing Members 
into closer involvement with their constituencies, but does 
constituency work at the same time weaken the electoral ties between 
M.P.s and their national parties? Certainly, the intent of MPs who do 
a great deal of constituency work is to create a buffer between 
themselves and adverse national swings by weakening the connection in 
the voter's minds between the individual Member and his or her 
national party. Stokes' research on the strength of the national 
swing in Great Britain has made many scholars skeptical about the 
electoral value of such a strategy [Stokes, 1967], and yet, some 
Members believe that they have built up a general following over the 
years by virtue of their constituency work. 
One clue that perhaps constituency work does indeed pay off is 
suggested by an observation that Ivor Crewe made in his analysis of 
the May 1979 General Election in the Times Guide to the House of 
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Commons. Discussing various anomalies in the national swing, Crewe 
observed that "Labour kept the swing down in its own marginals." Said 
he, "A uniform 5.2 percent national swing would have transferred 64 
seats from Labour to the Conservatives: the actual number changing 
hands was only 55 because although Labour lost 12 seats vulnerable to 
a swing of over 5.3 percent, it saved as many as 21 seats vulnerable 
to a swing below." [Crewe, 1979, p. 250] Curtice and Steed, 
comparing the swings of seats with new incumbents to those without in 
1974, conclude that there is strong circumstantial evidence of a 
personal vote which could explain this phenomenon. They estimate that 
such a following could account for approximately 1500 votes in an 
average size constituency. [Curtice and Steed, 1980, p. 409] In 
earlier work, we have shown that Members in marginal seats are 
quantitatively and qualitatively more aggressive in their approach to 
constituency work: they hold more surgeries, they visit their 
constituency more often, they solicit casework from their 
constituents, they refer fewer cases and they publicize their 
constituency work more frequently [Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1980]. 
The point is that M.P.s in marginal seats do more because their 
position is less secure. 
Consequently, it is not surprising to find that M.P.s in 
marginal seats have more favorable images among voters than do other 
M.P.s This can be measured in any number of ways. In our Gallup 
study, for instance, voters were asked to rate the job that their 
Member of Parliament had done -- whether it was very good, good, fair, 
poor or very poor. As Table V shows, those in marginal seats tended 
Member's Job Ratings 
Very good 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
Very poor 
DK 
MP Dislikes 
Yes 
No 
DK 
MP Likes 
Yes 
No 
DK 
Expectation of 
Helpfulness 
Very helpful 
Somewhat helpful 
Not very helpful 
Depends 
DK 
TABLE V 
MEMBER'S IMAGES BY MARGINALITY 
0 -5 
(430 ) 
19 
28 
19 
5 
2 
28 
14 
75 
10 
38 
50 
12 
37 
26 
10 
5 
21 
6 -9 
(307) 
10 
23 
26 
5 
1 
35 
9 
70 
20 
25 
49 
25 
28 
32 
9 
10 
21 
10 -15 
(334) 
15 
26 
21 
8 
2 
29 
19 
6 5  
18 
27 
52 
21 
31 
26 
11 
6 
26 
16 -20 
(361) 
5 
18 
25 
11 
3 
38 
23 
6 2  
15 
17 
6 7  
17 
21 
29 
20 
11 
20 
21-29 
(328) 
8 
17 
24 
4 
5 
41 
12 
6 2  
26 
18 
52 
30 
27 
26 
12 
11 
24 
Jo+ 
(19 5) 
11 
26 
18 
8 
4 
33 
7 
80 
14 
19 
58 
23 
25 
26 
6 
13 
30 
17 
18 
to give their representatives slightly higher ratings than those in 
safe seats. In particular, those in the most marginal category (i.e. 
0-5 percent) gave their Members the highest percentage of very good 
and good ratings. This category also had the lowest percentage of 
don't knows, which tells us something about the higher salience of 
Members in marginal seats. Another indicator of incumbent approval is 
the likes and dislikes question discussed earlier. Looking at Table 
V, we see that the highest percentage of positive references to the 
incumbent was in the 0-5 percent category of marginality. On the 
other hand, the same pattern does not hold for negative references, 
which would indicate that, on balance, Members in marginal seats seem 
to have more positive images. Lastly, one more indicator that the 
greater effort of Members in marginal seats may have some effect is 
the set of responses to the question "If you had a problem that your 
M.P. could do something about, do you think that he/she 
would be very helpful, somewhat helpful or not very helpful to you? " 
In all categories of marginality, Members fare pretty well, but the 
expectations of incumbent helpfulness are higher in the more marginal 
seats. This is that we would expect in the light of the finding that 
Members in marginal seats undertake more surgeries, solicit cases, 
have a higher propensity to advertise, and the rest. 
In another sense, however, the finding that Members in 
marginal seats have higher job evaluations and more favourable images 
is both surprising and notable. Conventional wisdom would lead us to 
expect that because of the strength of the party label in Great 
Britain, incumbent Members in safe seats (i.e. where the incumbent's 
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party has a large electoral advantage) should be evaluated more highly 
than those in unsafe seats: in other words, the more partisan the 
seat, the more favourable the Member's evaluation should be. What 
these data indicate is that preponderence of party strength in a 
constituency does not account for the level of the incumbent's 
evaluations. In fact, British incumbent Members tend to be more 
popular when their partisan advantage is less. 
Thus, it can be shown that M. P.s in marginal seats undertake 
higher levels of constituency service, and that they enjoy a greater 
amount of popularity among voters and a more favorable constituency 
image. Is there any evidence that the anomaly Crewe discusses can be 
traced to constituency work? Specifically, can it be shown that those 
who pursued a diligent constituency work strategy had better swings in 
19 79 than those who did not? To test this hypothesis, we rely on our 
sample of Members and agents, and in particular on incumbent Members 
who ran in both October 19 74 and May 19 79 . The reason for this is 
that we do not want to examine seats which involve new or retired 
Members since the hypothesis about constituency service requires 
continuity in the incumbent's tenure of office. The dependent 
variable is the swing ratio as reported in the election results of the 
Times Guide to the House of Commons 19 79 . Since regional deviations 
mattered in 19 79 , we must control for the swing in the region the 
incumbent was running in. In addition, there is some evidence that 
constituencies with substantial immigrant communities resisted the 
swing towards the Conservatives and also that there were differences 
beween metropolitan and nomnetropolitan areas. These variables were 
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included in the model.3 A variety of other variables were also tried 
in earlier specifications, including whether the Liberal candidate 
withdrew from the race, and whether the Member was a Government 
minister or opposition leader. The coefficients were not significant 
in these instances and they were accordingly left out of the final 
model. 
The key variable from the point of view of testing the 
hypothesis at hand is the measure of constituency service. Here we 
relied on our earlier studies which found that the four best 
indicators of what we termed an entreprenurial constituency style were 
the frequency of surgeries, whether the Member handled local cases, 
whether the Member publicized his or her casework activities, and 
whether the Member solicited cases. These activities were shown to be 
significantly related to party, year of election and the marginality 
of the Member's seat [Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 19 80]. 
The true model is that Members who adopt an aggresive 
constituency strategy undertake more constituency activities, and that 
the cumulative effect of these activities is higher name recognition 
and a better constituency reputation. This in turn produces votes. 
What we observe is not the true strategy S but activity indicators of 
that strategy a1 • • •  an. This is a latent variable model [Hanushek and 
Jackson, 19 77, Chapter 10]. Leaving aside more complex methodologies 
for dealing with this problem, we will settle for present purposes on 
a simple approach. It is to create an additive index with equal 
weighting for each activity: the individual activities are expressed 
as dummy variables and added together. The more activities an 
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individual undertakes, the more aggressive the entreprenurial strategy 
or effort is presumed to be. In smnmary , the model is 
Y = a + B1 Rswing + B2 Index 
+ B2 Imm. + B4 Met + B5 Non Met + u 
where: Y is the swing for the incumbent in 1979 
Rswing is the regional swing in the incumbents region 
Index is the index of entreprenurial activities 
Imm. is the percent immigrant in the constituency 
Met is a dummy indicating whether the constituency is a 
metropolitan city 
Non Met is a dummy indicating whether the constituency 
is a non-metropolitan city. 
Since the swing is the measure of the average Conservative gain and 
Labour loss, high values indicate a better swing for the Conservatives 
and lower values indicate a better swing for Labour. This should be 
remembered when interpreting the coefficients in the equations. Also, 
the samples are stratified into Conservative and Labour equations both 
for the reason just mentioned and to see whether the impact of 
casework on the swing applies equally to Conservative and Labour 
marginals. 
Table VI shows the results of the estimations with all the 
control variables included and then a reduced equation with the 
insignificant variables removed. In both the Conservative and Labour 
equations, the index of entrepreneurial activities variable has a 
statistically significant coefficient in the predicted direction. 
TABLE VI 
EFFECT OF CONSTITUENCY WORK ON SWING 
Conservative Labour 
Swing in 1979 Swing in 1979 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regional Swing .59** .56** .83** .79** 
(.16) ( .16) (.20) ( .19) 
Index .42* .44* -.74+ -.88* 
( .19) ( .19) ( .42) (.37) 
% Immigrant -4.24** -4.03** -1 .17 
(1 .25) (1.10) ( .95) 
Metropolitan .19 - 2.23* 1.92* 
Area ( .58) ( .97) (.90) 
Non-Metropolitan -.89 - .17 
City (.79) (2 .05) 
Constant 1.15 1.22 2 .45 3.06 
R
2 
.41 .39 .55 .52 
n 55 55 33 33 
Procedure: OLS 
Standard Errors in Parentheses and Unstandardized Coefficients Above 
** p < .01 
* p < .OS 
+ p < .10 
Source: CFF Study of Member's Activities 1979 
Times Guide to the House of Commons 
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Looking at the Labour equation, this means that higher constituency 
activity led to smaller swings against Labour incumbents in 1979. The 
size of the coefficient is quite large: for each activity in the 
simple linear index, the swing moved one point in the Labour, or 
negative, direction. Conversely, the. sign of the index variable 
coefficient is positive in the Conservative equation, indicating that 
activities undertaken by Conservative Members amplified the swing in 
their direction. The size of the estimated coefficient in the 
Conservative equation is approximately half the size of that in the 
Labour equation, which implies that the "cushioning" effect against 
the prevailing Conservative swing may have been stronger in May 1979 
than the "amplifying" affect in the direction of the Conservative 
swing. 
Not surprisingly, region proves to be significantly related 
(at the .01 level) in both the Conservative and Labour equations. The 
percent immigrant also matters, but in the Conservative equation only. 
This finding is consistent with an observation Ivor Crewe made in his 
Times Guide commentary when he noted that there were exceptions to the 
generalization that immigrants lowered the swing to the Conservatives 
and cited the examples of the three Hackney and three Islington 
constituencies. All six were Labour seats. In short, it appears that 
immigrants suppressed the Conservative swing in Conservative seats 
primarily. Lastly, the controls for the metropolitan and non­
metropolitan cities were insignificant in the Conservative equation, 
and only the metropolitan control was significant in the Labour 
equation. 
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The importance of constituency work in the estimated model is 
illustrated by the simulated swing scores in Table VII. This exercise 
shows the estimated swings that Conservative and Labour incumbents 
achieved in different regions at different levels of constituency 
involvement, holding constant other controls in the model and using 
the coefficients in equations 2 and 4. The measure of constituency 
involvement is the simple linear index of constituency activities 
which ranges in value between 1 and 5. For Labour incumbents, higher 
constituency involvement (measured as a higher index score) should 
lead to lower swing values. This is what Table VII shows. A Labour 
incumbent running in London, which had an average 6 .4 swing to the 
Conservatives, could have had a swing ranging from 7.2 to 3.7 
depending on his or her constituency involvement. A Labour 
constituency entrepreneur would beat the regional swing by one point: 
a Labour H. P. who neglected his or her constituency would have a swing 
which was 3.5 points higher than the London average. The penalty for 
constituency neglect in the May 1979 election was apparently quite 
high. This same pattern holds in regions where Labour on the whole 
did better. In the Northern area, for instance, the estimated swings 
vary between 5.3 for the neglectful M. P. to 1.7 for the M. P. who was 
active in the constituency. 
The pattern is of course reversed for the Conservative 
incumbents. Constituency work "cushioned" the national swing for the 
Conservative Member. Using London as an example again, the inactive 
Conservative incumbent could have expected a swing of 5.2 while the 
highly active Conservative incumbent could have expected a swing of 
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TABLE VII 
ESTIMATED SWING SCORES BY REGION AND ACTIVITY LEVEL 
Level of Conacit:um.cy Involvement 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 
London '•L 0.3 5.5 4.6 3.7 Labour Swing 
5.2 5;7 6.1 6.6 7 .0 Conservative Swing 
South Ease 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.3 3.4 Labour Swing 
5.0 5.4 5.9 6.3 6.8 Conservative Swing 
South and 7 .6 6. 7 5.8 5.0 4.1 Labour Swing 
Wessex 5.5 5.9 6.4 6.8 7 .3 Conservative Swing 
South Western 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.3 3.4 Labour Swing 
5.1 5.5 6.0 6.4 6.9 Conservat:ive Swing 
Eastern 7.5 6.7 5.8 4.9 4.0 Labour Swing 
5.5 5.9 6.3 6.8 7 .2 Conservative Swing 
Ease Midlands 6.8 6.0 5.0 4.2 3.3 Labour Swing 
4.9 6.4 5.8 6.3 6. 7 Conservat:ive Swing 
Midlands 7 .5 6.6 5.7 4.8 3.9 Labour Swing 
5.4 5.8 6.3 6.7 7.2 Conservative Swing 
North West 5.6 4.8 3.9 3.0 2.1 Labour Swing 
4.1 4.6 5.0 5.4 5.9 Conservative Swing 
Yorkshire 5.6 4.7 3.8 2.9 2.0 Labour Swing 
4.0 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.8 Conservative Swing 
Northern 5.3 4.4 3.5 2.6 l. 7 Labour Swing 
3.8 4.3 4.7 5.2 5.6 Conservative Swing 
Scotland 1.6 .7 -.1 -LO -l.9 Labour Swing 
l.3 l.7 2.1 2.6 3.0 Conservative Swing 
6.4 • 5.6 Wales 4.7 3.8 2.9 Labour Swing 
4.7 5.1 5.6 6.0 6.4 Conservative Swing 
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7 .o. Notice that the range for the Conservative incumbents is about 
half the size of that for the Labour incumbents. Similarly, in the 
Northern area, the range for the Conservative incumbent is between 3.8 
and 5.6, which is less than the range for the Labour incumbents. 
Though the "amplify ing" effect is somewhat lower than the "cushioning" 
effect, it still matters. The inactive Conservative incumbent in the 
North does slightly worse than the regional average of 3.9, whereas 
the active Conservative incumbent adds a point and one half to the 
regional swing. 
There are two additional points which should be raised about 
these estimations. First, the regional swing variables are important 
to the specification. Leaving them out causes the relationship 
between constituency activity and the dependent variable to weaken 
considerably . In effect, what the equation predicts are deviations of 
an individual Member's swing from the regional swing, or to put it 
another way , whether the Member beat the regional swing. As we have 
noted elsewhere, beating the regional swing might not be sufficient to 
ensure reelection and may , therefore, be small consolation to a hard 
working H.P. who was knocked out of office by the national 
government's unpopularity , but it does show that Members can have some 
influence over their electoral fate. It also suggests that with a 
more moderate national swing, many of ·the hard working defeated Labour 
M.P.s could have saved their seats. A second observation is that 
there was no statistical relationship between the size and direction 
of the swing in individual constituencies in 1974 and 1979. In this 
sense, the swing measure seems to capture very nicely short term 
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forces which are uncorrelated over time. 
Returning to the question of why Labour ran well in the 
marginals, what do we know? First, we know that high levels of 
constituency activity are related to a strong electoral incentive, and 
secondly that constituency work can contribute to better individual 
swings. The argument, therefore, is that Labour ran well in the 
marginals because Members in these seats paid more attention to their 
constituencies and were demonstrably more popular. But for their 
efforts, Labour losses in 1979 could have been even more disasterous. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The implication of this study is that there may be a growing 
"parochial" pull in British politics caused by the electorate's 
expectation (shared also by party activists and loyalists) that the 
M.P.s must know their constituencies well and undertake a high level 
of constituency service. Members who pursue this course can earn for 
themselves some measure of security against adverse national tides. 
The sufficiency of this buffer will depend on the size of the national 
swing and the marginality of the seat. 
What conditions will strengthen or weaken this "parochial" 
trend? Several possibilities come to mind. First, as suggested 
earlier, policies which strengthen the hand of the local party will 
strengthen "parochialism." Reselection would enable local parties to 
enforce a greater commitment to constituency work by making it easier 
to oust Members who are aloof from their constituencies. Evidence 
from Members themselves about what adoption committees ask and seem to 
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be looking for suggests that a feeling for the constituency and its 
problems is very important. Survey evidence in this paper has further 
shown that constituency work is considered important by party 
activists and identifiers. In this sense, the electoral incentive of 
winning votes and the party incentive converge in a way that the 
policy preferences of the two groups do not: nonidentifiers, weak 
major party identifiers and minor party identifiers do not share the 
policy preferences of major party activists and strong party 
identifiers, but diligent constituency work, it would seem, pleases 
all constituencies. This convergence of nonpolicy preferences could 
prove to be a very strong incentive. 
A second condition which would strengthen the 
"parochialization" of British politics would be the continued 
unpopularity of the two major parties and their policies. If the 
British economy continues to decline despite or because of monetarism, 
or if racial tensions worsen, or if the Northern Irish problem 
festers, the level of frustration and alienation among voters will 
increase. The need for the politician to secure a reliable base of 
support or to disassociate himself or herself from deteriorating 
conditions will also increase and efforts at the local level might 
rise accordingly. Local strategy may, therefore, be inversely related 
to the health of the national parties. This is not to say of course 
that British candidates will ever be able to separate themselves from 
national trends to the degree that American Congressinal candidates 
can, but it is to say that within the context of British political 
institutions and political experience, we may witness a movement in a 
more " parochial" direction as the dominant two party class cleavage 
ages. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The Gallup study samples 133 districts. During 1978 and 1979, we 
interviewed 1 46 MPs and agents, including some MPs and agents in 
the same constituencies and a few in constituencies not sampled 
by Gallup. Duplicate interviews and those outside the 1979 
framework are excluded in this study. 
2. The voter study consists of questions paralleling those asked in
the 1978 Congressional election study. These questions were 
included in the Gallup Polls regular post-election survey so that 
the file includes questions about the respondent's vote, various 
sociodemographic characteristics as well as those about the 
sitting Member. The voter study consists of 2031 observations. 
In the case of seats which had new Members running in May 1979, 
the questions refer to the previous sitting Member. 
3. Crewe also mentions that there were large swings in affluent
working class areas, but there were not enough cases of New Towns 
and "car worker seats" to test this hypothesis adequately. 
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